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In 2010, President Barack Obama appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear 
Future (BRC) in order to study options for dealing with nuclear waste as alternatives to replace 
permanent disposal at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The BRC recommended a new voluntary siting 
mechanism based on the Nuclear Waste Negotiator (NWN), an expired program decried as 
“radioactive racism” for its almost exclusive focus on Native Americans. The NWN inspired numerous 
articles supporting or opposing tribes’ efforts to host nuclear waste facilities. Rather than focus on the 
tribal majorities that have pursued such facilities, as previous scholarship has done, this Note refocuses 
the analysis on the substantial tribal minorities that have actively opposed their leaderships’ decisions to 
host such facilities. The Note has two main goals. First, it seeks to elucidate the uphill legal battle that 
minority tribe members face under current law if they decide to challenge the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 
approval of the lease for a facility that their tribal leadership has signed. Second, it offers specific 
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The year 2012 was the hottest on record in the United States and the second most volatile as 
measured by the damage from natural disasters.1 Scientists “doubt that such a striking new record would 
have been set without the backdrop of global warming caused by the human release of greenhouse 
gases,” one of which is carbon dioxide.2 Carbon dioxide represents 82.5% of U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions,3 and the electricity industry accounts for 38% of these emissions,4 primarily due to coal and 
gas-fired power plants.5 In order to achieve maximum reductions in greenhouse gases, many believe that 
the U.S. should invest in nuclear energy.6 Before it can be a viable fuel option, however, policy-makers 
must devise a solution to the problem of how to dispose of the radioactive waste that is regularly 
                                                
1 Justin Gillis, Not Even Close: 2012 Was Hottest Ever in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A1. 
2 Id. 
3 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 
1990-2012 ES-7 (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-
Inventory-2014-Main-Text.pdf. 
4 Id. at 3-14. 
5 See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Electricity Sector Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa. 
gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity.html (last updated Apr. 17, 2014). 
6 See Oliver Morton, Special Report on Nuclear Energy: The dream that failed, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2012, at 13; 
see also Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future: Memorandum for the Secretary of Energy, 75 Fed. Reg. 
5485, 5485 (Feb. 3, 2010). 




generated by nuclear power plants. This issue has been called “one of the most intractable problems 
facing the nuclear power industry throughout the world.”7   
 
Even without an expansion in nuclear power, however, the question remains of what to do with 
the 2,000–2,400 metric tons of waste that is produced annually8 by the U.S.’s 104 nuclear reactors,9 in 
addition to the existing 65,000 metric tons that lack a permanent storage facility.10 For two decades, the 
federal government pursued a plan to house a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, despite fierce 
opposition from Nevadans.11 Even if this facility were to ever receive wastes—an unlikely prospect given 
current political realities 12 —it would almost immediately reach its capacity, necessitating a new 
repository.13  
 
Concurrent with its efforts to host a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain, the federal 
government was also attempting to host a temporary storage facility for wastes. Chief among these 
efforts was the creation of a short-lived Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator (NWN) in order to 
incentivize, through monetary compensation, states and Indian tribes to host such a temporary facility.14  
A lack of interest among other communities15 ensured that tribes were almost exclusively the only parties 
that sought to host one,16 and the NWN’s implementing statute provided for the program’s automatic 
defunding in 1995 before the successfully siting of a facility.17 A private effort that evolved out of the 
NWN program involving the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians (“Skull Valley Band”), a tribe located 
outside of Salt Lake City, Utah, also failed due largely to political opposition within the state.18 These 
voluntary efforts to site such hazardous and nuclear waste projects have simultaneously been decried as 
“radioactive racism”19 and lauded for providing much-needed economic benefits to tribes and for 
fostering their self-determination.20 
 
                                                
7 MASS. INST. TECH, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 10 (2003), 
available at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-full.pdf. 
8 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY 4 
(2012) [hereinafter Blue Ribbon Commission Report], available at http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf. 
9 Map of Power Reactor Sites, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ 
map-power-reactors.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2012). 
10 Blue Ribbon Commission Report, supra note 8, at 14. 
11 See RICHARD B. STEWART & JANE B. STEWART, FUEL CYCLE TO NOWHERE: U.S. LAW AND POLICY ON 
NUCLEAR WASTE 4 (2011). 
12 See id. at 9, 187. The Department of Energy (DOE) withdrew its license application for the site “with 
prejudice” on March 3, 2010. MARK HOLT, CONG. RES. SERV., CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33461.pdf. 
13 See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY ON THE NEED FOR A SECOND REPOSITORY 1 (2008) [hereinafter Need 
for a Second Repository], available at http://www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/second_repository_rpt_120908. 
pdf; see also HOLT, supra note 12, at 12; 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) (2012). 
14 See infra Part II.C. 
15  See PUB. CITIZEN, RADIOACTIVE RACISM: THE HISTORY OF TARGETING NATIVE AMERICAN 
COMMUNITIES WITH HIGH-LEVEL ATOMIC WASTE DUMPS (2014), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
radioactiveracism.pdf. 
16 See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, MRS GRANT APPLICANT LIST (1997), available at pbadupws.nrc. 
gov/docs/ML0037/ML003733648.pdf. 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 10250 (2012). 
18 See infra Part III.B. 
19 RADIOACTIVE RACISM, supra note 15. 
20 See, e.g., Jana L. Walker & Kevin Gover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal Projects on Indian Lands, 
10 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 231 (1993). 




In 2010, President Barack Obama appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 
Nuclear Future (BRC) in order to study other options for dealing with nuclear waste.21 In 2012, the BRC 
recommended a new voluntary mechanism for siting a repository involving states, municipalities, and 
tribes.22  The BRC suggested that this mechanism should be implemented by creating a program similar 
to the expired NWN, which would provide compensation to parties willing to host a facility.23  If history 
is an indication, tribes will almost certainly be prominently represented among the applicants in such a 
process.24 
 
The BRC’s proposals have brought voluntary siting issues back to the forefront of the nuclear 
waste debate. Previous scholarship on Native American tribes’ voluntary efforts to host nuclear waste 
storage facilities dates from the era of the NWN program. On one side of the debate are those who 
believe that tribes are fortunate to receive such offers for economic development and should have a right 
to pursue them freely.25 On the other side are scholars who use concepts such as the federal trust 
responsibility and environmental justice to cast doubt on the fairness of allowing tribes to make these 
decisions. These scholars emphasize the environmental hazards of such projects and the degree to which 
the poor economic conditions of the tribes have a coercive effect on their decisions.26 Still others have 
tried to bridge the gap between environmentalists and self-determinationists in various ways.27 While all 
                                                
21 See HOLT, supra note 12, at 2. 
22 Blue Ribbon Commission Report, supra note 8, at viii. 
23 Id. 
24 See infra Part II.C. 
25 See, e.g., Walker & Gover, supra note 20, at 231 (“This Article advocates that the evaluation of the viability of 
waste disposal projects to be developed on Indian lands should be governed by the overriding goals of tribal self-
determination and economic self-sufficiency, not public sentiment.”); Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping 
Environmental Paternalism: One Tribe’s Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 933, 933 (1992) (“[I]n those cases where a community wishes to have [a waste disposal facility], its decision is to 
be respected.”); Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 
290, 365–76 (2009) (arguing for a new model of federal-tribal relations that tilts the balance between the trust doctrine 
and native sovereignty in favor of the latter); Mark Poole, Nuclear Sovereignty: Reservation Waste Disposal for the Twenty-First 
Century and Beyond?, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165, 165 (1998) (“Despite the longstanding conflicts of 
law among federal, state, and Native American sovereigns and the complexity of environmental regulation and health 
and safety issues in the area of nuclear disposal, the Mescalero Apache should be afforded the opportunity through self-
determination to pursue the location of a private nuclear waste disposal facility on reservation land.”). 
26 See, e.g., Jon D. Erickson, Duane Chapman & Ronald E. Johnny, Monitored Retrievable Storage of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel in Indian Country: Liability, Sovereignty, and Socioeconomics, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 73, 103 (1994) (“The siting of an MRS 
on an Indian reservation is unethical and dangerous.”); Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: 
A Paradoxical Trade, 12 LAW & INEQ. 267, 270 (1994) (“The essence of the proposed waste agreement is land for 
money.”); Charles K. Johnson, A Sovereignty of Convenience: Native American Sovereignty and the United States Government's Plan 
for Radioactive Waste on Indian Land, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 589, 594 (1994) (“[T]he United States government 
has now discovered a new useful commodity belonging to the Native American community. That commodity is Indian 
national sovereignty.”); but see, Sierra M. Jefferies, Environmental Justice and the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians’ Proposal to 
Store Nuclear Waste, 27 J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 409, 409 (2007) (arguing that expanding environmental justice to 
include voluntary siting scenarios, such as the Skull Valley Band’s, risks environmental justice “being co-opted into the 
larger environmental or civil rights movements”); James L. Huffman, An Explanatory Essay on Native Americans and 
Environmentalism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 903 (1992) (“While white Americans pursue harmony with mother nature 
from their comfortable offices on the Potomac and their high tech kayaks on the Colorado, Native Americans will 
struggle to feed their children and make sense of a culture not of nature but of alcohol, poverty and desperation.”). 
27 See, e.g., Louis G. Leonard, III, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environmental Justice in the Mescalero Apache’s 
Decision to Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 651, 687–92 (1997) (arguing that environmental justice and 
self-determination are compatible because environmental justice only seeks to empower underrepresented communities 
with the knowledge they need to make an informed decision); Martin D. Topper, Environmental Protection in Indian Country: 
Equity or Self-Determination, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 693, 701 (1994) (“[T]he special relationship between 
Indians and the federal government requires that the special legal status of tribal governments be considered when 




of this prior scholarship is useful in setting the tone of the current debate over voluntary siting, it 
emphasizes the tribe members who support the construction of the facility on their reservation without 
adequately considering the concerns of minority tribe members who oppose the facility. Minority tribe 
members are a critical constituency in the siting decision because only a bare majority of members have 
tended to support nuclear waste projects. 28  Moreover, current voluntary siting proposals do not 
differentiate between the facility’s prospective neighbors who may have voted against the facility and 
tribe members living off the reservation who may have supported it.29 
 
Rather than harmonizing previous scholarship on environmental justice and self-determination, 
this Note seeks to refocus the analysis on the minority of tribe members who have chosen to actively 
oppose their tribe’s decision to host a repository or storage facility. The Note has two main goals. First, 
it seeks to elucidate the uphill legal battle that minority tribe members face, under current law, if they 
decide to challenge the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA)30 approval of the lease for a facility that their 
tribal leadership has signed. While some members might be able to significantly delay the project or seek 
damages from the BIA in case of an accident,31 they will be unable to thwart the project solely through a 
legal challenge. Second, it offers specific recommendations for Congress to implement as part of its 
impending nuclear waste legislation. Congress should ensure that minority tribe members’ interests are 
adequately considered and their burden is lessened in the event that a facility is sited on their reservation. 
 
The Note is organized as follows: 
 
Part II provides more background on the nuclear waste issue. Specifically, it addresses the 
existing and future production of waste, past efforts to site storage facilities and repositories, and the 
current voluntary siting proposal in the BRC’s Report. 
 
Part III addresses the history of Native Americans and nuclear waste through a case study of the 
Skull Valley Band’s attempt to site a storage facility on its reservation. It also discusses the Indian Long 
Term Leasing Act of 1955 (ILTLA),32 the federal law that requires BIA approval of tribal leases, which 
served as a basis for the BIA’s disapproval of the Skull Valley Band’s lease, and would presumably apply 
to a future lease. 
 
Part IV discusses the difficulty that minority tribe members would face in court if they attempted 
to enjoin the construction of the facility or seek damages from the BIA for a leak. First, members could 
sue the BIA under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)33 for violations of the ILTLA or the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).34 If successful, tribe members would only achieve a delay 
in construction of the facility, not the death of the project. Moreover, Rule 19 may bar their ILTLA 
claim because the tribe is probably a required party and cannot be sued without its consent. Second, tribe 
                                                                                                                                                       
providing protection from the risks to health and environment caused by environmental pollution on or near Indian 
lands.”). 
28 See infra Part IV.C. 
29 See infra Part II.B–C (discussing the NWN’s process of deferring to majority votes and the BRC’s proposal to 
base its voluntary siting method on the NWN); See infra Part III.B (discussing Margene Bullcreek’s efforts to prevent 
other tribe members from siting a nuclear waste facility nearby her residence). 
30 The BIA is an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI). 
31 Many nuclear waste storage facilities are generally considered to be safe, but there have been some alarming 
hazards involving such facilities. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Underground Nuclear Tanks Leaking in Washington State, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2013, at A12. 
32 Pub. L. No. 84-255, 69 Stat. 539 (1955) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2012)). 
33 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)). 
34 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)). 




members could sue the BIA for damages under the Indian Tucker Act35 for breach of the BIA’s trust 
responsibility under the ILTLA, but will be unlikely to succeed unless they own the land on which the 
facility is built. 
 
In light of the lack of legal remedies for minority tribe members, Part V makes several 
recommendations for Congress to consider in its forthcoming nuclear waste legislation. Finally, Part VI 
presents a brief summary of the Note’s main themes. 
 
II.  NUCLEAR WASTE AND DISPOSAL EFFORTS   
 
A. The Generation of Radioactive Waste 
 
Radioactive waste is almost exclusively a byproduct of the production of nuclear weapons and 
the generation of electricity by nuclear power plants.36 Much of it must be isolated from human contact 
for thousands of years because of its exceedingly long half-life.37 For several decades, there has been a 
broad consensus in the U.S. that the only way to dispose of the country’s most dangerous nuclear waste 
in perpetuity is through deep geological disposal.38 While such a repository has been found for various 
defense-related wastes,39 the problem since the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA 
of 1982)40 has been to find a place for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and other civilian high-level waste 
(HLW).41 
 
Currently, about 65,000 metric tons of SNF is in temporary storage at the reactors that generated 
it,42 posing public health, proliferation, and terrorism-related concerns.43 This total is increasing steadily 
                                                
35 63 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012)). 
36  See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND 
NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 25 (1995). 
37 Richard B. Stewart, Solving the U.S. Nuclear Waste Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10783 
(2010). 
38 Id. at 10785; see also JAMES D. WERNER, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE, (May 
24, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42513.pdf. 
39 See Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.wipp.energy.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 
2014). 
40 Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2012)). 
41 There are various classifications of radioactive wastes. SNF consists of fuel rods that were used to heat the 
water that runs nuclear power plants but have become too radioactive and need to be discarded. See Gerrard, supra note 
36, at 28; see also Blue Ribbon Commission Report, supra note 8, at 96. HLW is a product of SNF reprocessing, an activity that 
President Ford ordered terminated in the civilian context in 1976. See Gerrard, supra note 36, at 28; see also Blue Ribbon 
Commission Report, supra note 8, at 96. Transuranic (TRU) waste is “waste other than SNF and HLW that contains 
concentrations of transuranic elements.” Blue Ribbon Commission Report, supra note 8, at 96. Mill tailings are refuse from 
uranium ore processing. Id. Low-Level Waste (LLW) is “waste other than SNF, HLW, TRU waste, or mill tailings.” Id. 
Additionally, the term “mixed waste” includes a mix of chemically hazardous waste and radioactive elements. Mixed 
waste is subject to regulation by the DOE or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA), 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (2012), and by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (2012). See HOLT, supra note 12, at 11. The waste 
classification system has been criticized for focusing too heavily on the source of the waste as opposed to its 
radioactivity. Accordingly, the NRC is currently working on a new system that would base the classification on the level 
of risk posed by the waste. Blue Ribbon Commission Report, supra note 8, at 98. 
42 Blue Ribbon Commission Report, supra note 8, at 14. In addition to the increasing amount of SNF that requires 
disposal, there remain a few thousand metric tons of HLW from the era of civilian reprocessing. See supra note 41. 
43 See Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS. 5–11 (2006), available at www.nap.edu/catalog/11263.html; see also HOLT, supra note 12, at 12–13. 




at a rate of 2,000–2,400 metric tons of SNF per year.44 The U.S.’s reliance on storage, rather than 
disposal, is so singular that the BRC has concluded, “[s]torage is not only playing a more prominent and 
protracted role in the nuclear fuel cycle than once expected, it is the only element of the back end of the 
fuel cycle that is currently being deployed on an operational scale in the United States.”45 
 
B. The Blue Ribbon Commission’s Proposal for the Voluntary Siting of Nuclear 
Waste Facilities 
 
In 2010, when it became clear that progress on the Yucca Mountain repository would not 
proceed for the foreseeable future, 46  President Obama created the BRC in 2010 to conduct a 
“comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all 
alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used nuclear fuel and nuclear 
waste.”47 Released on January 26, 2012,48 the BRC report advocated a “new, consent-based approach to 
siting future nuclear waste management facilities,” the creation of a new agency to manage nuclear waste, 
and the development of storage facilities alongside repositories.49 The BRC’s proposal was inspired by 
the NWN50 and recommended that the new siting process should resemble the NWN albeit under 
different leadership.51 Since the BRC issued its report, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced S. 1240, 
the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013, in the 113th Congress in order to create an agency to 
implement the consent-based approach to nuclear waste repository siting. 52  The bill specifies a 
preference for the co-location of storage facilities and repositories.53 The Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources held a hearing on the bill on July 30, 2013.54   
 
The issuance of the BRC report and introduction of S. 1240 require a reconsideration of the 
relationship of Native Americans to nuclear waste because of the similarity of the proposed voluntary 
siting method to the process that almost led to the siting of a nuclear waste storage facility on the Skull 
Valley Band’s reservation in the 1990s and 2000s. 
                                                
44 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS. at 4. 
45 Blue Ribbon Commission Report, supra note 8, at 33. 
46 While this Note focuses on attempts to site nuclear waste facilities on Indian reservations, the U.S. has also 
attempted to site a repository on federal land at Yucca Mountain. The NWPA of 1982 ordered the DOE to recommend 
three sites for detailed study, called “characterization,” as potential repositories. 42 U.S.C § 10132(b)(1)(B) (2012). The 
DOE proposed the sites, which were approved by President Reagan in 1986, Gerrard, supra note 36, at 30, but Congress 
intervened with the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA of 1987), deciding to only allow site 
characterization at Yucca Mountain, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5011, 101 Stat. 
1330 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a) (2012)). Because of its treatment of Nevada, some have termed the 
NWPAA of 1987 the “Screw Nevada [A]ct of 1987.” Leave well alone: The best thing to do with nuclear waste is to stash it away, 
not reprocess it, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21549102. For the moment, Nevada 
has defeated the Yucca Mountain project by convincing the DOE to withdraw its license application for the site “with 
prejudice” on March 3, 2010, HOLT, supra note 12, at 1, but the tide may turn again if the political climate changes. See 
Stewart & Stewart, supra note 11, at 9, 187. 
47 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future: Memorandum for the Secretary of Energy, 75 Fed. Reg. 5,485, 
5,485 (Feb. 3, 2010). Even if Yucca Mountain became a politically viable option, the quantity of waste currently in 
existence exceeds its statutory capacity, and an additional repository would have to be constructed. See Need for a Second 
Repository, supra note 13, at 1; see also HOLT, supra note 12, at 12; 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) (2012). 
48 Matthew L. Wald, Revamped Search Urged for a Nuclear Waste Site, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at A13. 
49 See Blue Ribbon Commission Report, supra note 8, at vii. 
50 See id. at 40. 
51 See id. at viii. 
52 S. 1240, 113th Cong. (2013). 
53 Id. at §§ 305(b)(2)(B), 306(c)(2). 
54 To Consider the Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 113th 
Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg85875/pdf/CHRG-113shrg85875.pdf.  




C. The Origin of Attempts to Site Nuclear Waste Storage Facilities on Native 
American Reservations  
 
In 1987, Congress mandated that the DOE study the need for a monitored retrievable storage 
facility (MRS).55 Storage facilities are used to prepare waste for placement in a repository, but unlike 
repositories, they are not intended to house waste permanently.56 In March 1987, DOE recommended a 
site in Tennessee for an MRS facility, but due to political pressure from the state, Congress scrapped the 
plan later that year.57 
 
Instead, Congress created the NWN in order to find a state or tribe that was willing to accept a 
repository or an MRS facility.58 Providing for a three-tiered program by which states and tribes could 
apply to host facilities with each tier growing closer to actual siting of the facility, the statute authorized 
the NWN to negotiate agreements and provide for compensation for affected states, municipalities, and 
tribes.59 Phase I meant initial consideration of the site; Phase II-A required public information hearings; 
Phase II-B required feasibility studies; and the final phase was siting of the facility.60 The initiative ran 
out of time before a facility was sited because the statute provided for the NWN to be automatically 
dissolved in 1995.61 
 
During the operation of the NWN program, Nuclear Waste Negotiator David Leroy conducted 
a concerted campaign to find Native American hosts for the facilities. Addressing the National Congress 
of American Indians in 1991, Leroy claimed, “With atomic facilities designed to safely hold radioactive 
materials with half-lives of thousands of years, it is the Native American culture and perspective that is 
best designed to correctly consider and balance the benefits and burdens of these proposals.”62 When 
applications arrived for Phase I MRS grants, sixteen out of twenty came from Native American tribes, 
and all Phase II applicants were tribes.63 Nevertheless, the NWN expired in 1995 without having made 
any substantial progress on siting because host states had not supported the process.64 For example, 
when the Mescalero Apache Nation of New Mexico appeared on the verge of hosting an MRS facility, 
Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) succeeded in attaching an appropriations rider that effectively killed the 
project.65 
 
The Skull Valley Band was one of the Phase II applicants under the NWN program.66 When the 
NWN dissolved in 1995, the Skull Valley Band met with a private consortium of utilities and negotiated 
a lease for a private storage facility on their reservation.67 After reviewing the Environmental Impact 
                                                
55 42 U.S.C. § 10161(b)(1) (2012). 
56  See JOHN E. CANTLON, U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BD., NUCLEAR WASTE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD’S PERSPECTIVE 9–10 
(1996), available at http://www.nwtrb.gov/reports/wastemgt.pdf. 
57 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5021, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 10162(a) (2012)). 
58 Id. § 5041 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10242(b)(2) (2012)). With Yucca Mountain as the designated site for the 
repository, attention turned toward siting the MRS facility. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 10243(d)(2) (2012). 
60 Collins & Hall, supra note 26, at 291. 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 10250 (2012). 
62 RADIOACTIVE RACISM, supra note 15. 
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Statement (EIS), the BIA decided to disapprove the lease.68 Although a United States District Court 
determined that the BIA’s disapproval was “arbitrary and capricious,”69 the DOI did not appeal that 
determination.70 It is likely that staunch political opposition by the people of Utah contributed to the 
project’s demise despite the court ruling that seemed to favor the project’s backers.71 Part III examines 
the Skull Valley Band’s attempt to host a storage facility in greater detail. 
 
III.  NATIVE AMERICANS AND NUCLEAR WASTE 
 
 Native Americans have had a long and troubled history with nuclear materials,72 but their 
involvement in the waste disposal issue dates to the relatively recent era of the NWN.73 This Part 
discusses Native Americans’ experience with nuclear waste through a case study of the Skull Valley 
Band’s attempt to build a storage facility and the BIA’s disapproval of its lease due largely to political 
pressure imposed by non-Indians within the state. Before turning to the Skull Valley Band, however, it is 
necessary to review the ILTLA, the leasing statute that allows the BIA to review and approve leases of 
Indian lands. 
 
A. The Indian Long Term Leasing Act 
 
The executive branch must always consider the interests of the tribes when conducting activities 
or making decisions affecting them. “It is fairly clear that any Federal government action is subject to the 
United States' fiduciary responsibilities toward the Indian tribes.”74 One of the ways in which Congress 
has required that the executive branch exercise its trust responsibility is by giving the executive the power 
to approve leases of Indian lands. Native Americans are generally unable to execute long-term business 
leases without first obtaining the BIA’s approval.75 
 
The ILTLA was designed to “protect[] Native American interests by insuring that their land 
transactions with third parties are advantageous.”76 It allows Native Americans to lease lands that they 
own with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior acting through the BIA.77 Leases may be approved 
for a period of up to ten, twenty-five, or ninety-nine years, depending on the purpose and the tribe 
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involved; and the parties can extend them once for up to twenty-five years.78 If Native Americans desire 
to lease their land for a longer period of time, as a nuclear waste repository would require, Congress 
would have to amend the statute79 or use its plenary power to expressly authorize the action.80 Further, 
the Secretary must consider various factors, commonly referred to as § 415(a) factors, before approving 
any lease. Specifically, 
 
[T]he Secretary of the Interior shall first satisfy himself that adequate consideration has 
been given to the relationship between the use of the leased lands and the use of 
neighboring lands; the height, quality, and safety of any structures or other facilities to be 
constructed on such lands; the availability of police and fire protection and other 
services; the availability of judicial forums for all criminal and civil causes arising on the 
leased lands; and the effect on the environment of the uses to which the leased lands will 
be subject.81 
 
The implementing regulations for 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) at 25 C.F.R. Part 162 were revised in 
2013.82 The change has been called “the most comprehensive reform of federal regulations governing 
Native American land surface leasing in more than 50 years.”83 Replacing the former dichotomy between 
agricultural and non-agricultural leases, the BIA now applies different regulations for residential, 
business, and wind and solar resource leases.84 “Commercial or industrial leases for retail, office, 
manufacturing, storage, biomass, waste-to-energy, or other business purposes” fall under the business 
leasing provisions in Subpart D.85  
 
The BIA “will approve”86 a business lease unless it meets one of following three conditions: 
“[t]he required consents have not been obtained from the parties to the lease,” “[t]he requirements of 
this subpart have not been met,” or “[the BIA] find[s] a compelling reason to withhold [its] approval in 
order to protect the best interests of the Indian landowners.”87 Before the BIA approves a lease, Subpart 
D requires that it “determine that the lease is in the best interest of the Indian landowners.”88 This 
determination requires the BIA to “[i]dentify potential environmental impacts and ensure compliance 
with all applicable environmental laws, land use laws, and ordinances;” “assure [itself] that adequate 
consideration has been given to the factors in 25 U.S.C. § 415(a);” and “[r]equire any lease modifications 
or mitigation measures necessary to satisfy any requirements including any other Federal or tribal land 
use requirements.”89 The BIA must “defer, to the maximum extent possible, to the Indian landowners' 
determination that the lease is in their best interest” and cannot “unreasonably withhold approval of a 
lease.”90  
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Although these regulations were not applicable when the Skull Valley Band attempted to host a 
storage facility, an understanding of them will be necessary for future minority tribe members, and they 
provide a general idea of how the BIA has applied the approval procedure in practice in recent years. 
 
B.  The Skull Valley Band Attempts to Site a Facility on its Reservation 
 
The Skull Valley Goshute Reservation is located within the geographical boundaries of Tooele 
County, Utah, about fifty miles west of Salt Lake City.91 It consists of 18,000 acres that were set aside by 
executive order in 1917 and 1918.92 While 134 members belong to the tribe, only about fifteen to twenty 
of them live on the reservation.93 
 
Toxic industries surround the reservation, including a weapons testing center, a storage facility 
for nerve agents, a magnesium production facility, two power plants, and others.94 Levels of poverty and 
unemployment on the reservation are very high,95 as the land has little economic potential.96 Indeed, 
most reservation lands are unproductive because the federal government intentionally set aside the least 
productive land as reservations.97 Thus, in order to bring much needed income to the reservation, the 
tribe applied for and received Phase I and II-A grants from the NWN to study the possibility of hosting 
a nuclear waste storage facility.98 As discussed earlier, the NWN program was short-lived.99 
 
When the NWN program expired in 1995, a private utility consortium formed to continue 
progress towards the siting of a facility, but the Skull Valley Band did not begin negotiations with this 
consortium immediately.100 The Mescalero Apache Tribe, another one of the Phase II-A grant recipients, 
approached the consortium and proposed its own deal.101 In March 1995, the Mescalero Apaches voted 
593-372 to complete negotiations with the consortium, a miraculous occurrence since in January 1995 
the tribe had voted 490-362 to reject the facility.102 There were accusations among minority tribe 
members that the vote had been rigged by false claims and the promise of cash rewards.103 Despite the 
tribe’s newfound support for the project, the two parties failed to strike a final agreement, and the 
project collapsed in 1996.104 After the Mescalero Apaches withdrew, the Skull Valley Band met with 
some of the same utilities, which had created a consortium called Private Fuel Storage, LLC (PFS),105 and 
proposed their own deal.106 
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On May 20, 1997, the Skull Valley Band signed a lease with PFS,107 and the BIA issued a 
“conditional approval” on May 23.108 Nevertheless, the project was not without significant dissent 
among the members of the Skull Valley Band itself. Chairman Leon Bear, a supporter of the project, 
asserts that two thirds of the tribe’s members voted for the facility,109 but Margene Bullcreek, a chief 
opponent of the project and one of the few residents of the reservation,110 claims that a majority of 
members living on the reservation actually opposed the project.111 Bullcreek founded a group called 
Ohngo Guadadeh Devia that ran protests against the waste facility112 and even intervened in the NRC’s 
licensing proceeding.113 Bullcreek opposed the project because of the potential harm it posed to the 
reservation and asserted that the money from PFS would not be shared equally among tribe members.114  
She said that she had never been permitted to see the lease terms115 and viewed the tribe’s leadership as 
“unyielding and corrupt.”116 In 2005, when NPR’s Morning Edition interviewed her and Chairman Bear, 
she was not on speaking terms with him.117 In the interview, she asserted, “I don’t think it’s worth selling 
our Mother Earth. I don’t think it’s worth giving up the battles that was [sic] fought by our forefathers to 
hold onto at least one bit of land.”118 
 
Minority tribe members participated in the campaign to prevent the facility from being built, but 
their efforts were secondary to the firestorm of political activity outside the reservation that sought to 
make final approval of the lease impossible before completion of the EIS.119 State leaders openly 
pressured the BIA to disapprove the lease120 and succeeded in convincing Congress to designate as a 
protected area the Cedar Mountain Wilderness Area, preventing construction of a required right-of-
way.121 When the BIA finally reviewed the EIS, it issued a Record of Decision (ROD) disapproving the 
lease.122 The ROD based its decision on the BIA’s trust duty to the tribe,123 the lack of a requirement 
that the BIA approve the lease,124 the inadequacy of the EIS,125 the 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) factors,126 the 
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BIA’s poor understanding of nuclear issues and resulting inability to monitor the lease,127 and the 
possibility that nuclear waste might remain on the reservation permanently in light of the uncertainty 
over construction of the Yucca Mountain repository.128   
 
The Skull Valley Band responded to the ROD by suing the BIA in U.S. District Court for the 
District of Utah.  In Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Davis, the court held that the BIA’s disapproval 
was arbitrary and capricious.129 Nevertheless, there does not appear to have been any further progress on 
the project, and the BIA has not issued another ROD. A brief glance at PFS’s website in April 2013 
revealed that it had not been updated since 2004, and the website appears to no longer function as of 
2014,130 two signs that the consortium has abandoned its efforts.131 
 
Although the minority tribe members appear to have received their desired result, their 
secondary role in the debate is troubling because their lack of an ability to define their own destiny leaves 
them dependent on the activities of others. As the next Part demonstrates, the legal system would 
similarly leave them without any alternative recourse. For this reason, it is imperative that Congress act 
to afford them greater consideration in the siting process. 
 
IV.  THE LACK OF LEGAL REMEDIES FOR MINORITY TRIBE MEMBERS 
 
 This Part discusses the uphill legal battle that minority tribe members will face if they challenge 
the BIA’s approval of the lease for a nuclear waste facility or seek damages from the BIA for an accident 
at the site. These claims will be highly fact dependent, but some generalizations can be made. In order to 
challenge the lease approval, members can bring suit under the APA for violations of the ILTLA and 
NEPA. If successful, this suit would only force the BIA to revise its justification for approval of the 
lease or to consider more of the project’s adverse impacts. Although the delay that results from such 
suits has contributed to the downfall of projects in the past,132 minority tribe members have only a slim 
possibility of success. Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 may bar most minority tribe 
members from raising their claims under the ILTLA. Second, if an accident occurs after the facility is 
built, members could sue the BIA for damages under the Indian Tucker Act for breach of its fiduciary 
duty, but are unlikely to succeed unless they own the land on which the facility is built. Nevertheless, 
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A.  Minority Tribe Members Would First Have to Exhaust Their Administrative 
Remedies 
 
 The highest adjudicatory body for Native American affairs within the DOI is the Interior Board 
of Indian Appeals (IBIA).133 The IBIA accords significant deference to the decisions of BIA staff.134 In 
reviewing the approval of leases, the IBIA does no more than “ensure that proper consideration was 
given to all legal prerequisites to the exercise of discretion.”135 In light of the ILTLA’s merely procedural 
requirements and the significant deference given to staff decisions, it will be difficult for minority tribe 
members to succeed in defeating the facility in an administrative proceeding. The main purpose of 
appealing to the IBIA will be to attain a right to judicial review and to further delay construction of the 
facility.136 No facility may be built without BIA approval of a lease, and that approval is “not final during 
the appeal period and during the pendency of an appeal, unless otherwise provided by law.”137  
 
Regarding the effect of an appeal to the IBIA, the experience of the Skull Valley Band provides 
an instructive precedent. After the tribe received conditional approval of the storage facility’s lease,138 
members of the tribe’s council appealed to the IBIA in order to challenge that approval.139 The board 
held that individual tribe members do not have standing to claim that the tribe did not properly approve 
a lease140 or that the BIA’s delay in complying with NEPA violated its trust duties to the tribe.141 The 
IBIA explicitly rejected the argument that members of the tribe’s council had special standing to assert 
these interests.142  
 
Rather than challenge the conditional approval of the lease on behalf of the tribe, the board 
suggested that tribe members would have to wait for a final approval in order to challenge the lease “to 
protect their interests, as individuals, from alleged adverse health, economic, or environmental effects 
that would result from the proposed storage facility.”143 
 
B.  A Successful Action for Injunctive Relief Would Only Delay Construction of the 
Facility 
 
Once the minority tribe members exhaust their administrative remedies, they will be able to 
challenge the BIA’s lease approval in federal court under the APA.144 Under the APA, a court may “hold 
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unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”145 Accordingly, they must identify provisions of law that the 
BIA could have violated by approving the lease. Their two claims will likely originate from NEPA, which 
requires environmental reviews, and the ILTLA, which requires BIA approval of leases.146 Minority tribe 
members could use both of these claims to delay the commencement of construction. 
 
1. NEPA Claims 
 
NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the effects on the human environment resulting 
from their major actions,147 but places no substantive obligations on agencies beyond complying with its 
procedural mandate.148 NEPA applies to many ordinary uses of Native American land because of the 
federal hook created by the lease approval.149 Plaintiffs frequently use NEPA suits to delay projects for a 
significant period of time while they mobilize opposition outside the courts.150 Plaintiffs argue that the 
relevant federal agency did not prepare the requisite environmental review or that the review was 
inadequate. Courts will sometimes require an agency to prepare an EIS in a case where the agency has 
decided one is not necessary or to compile a more complete EIS when it is deficient. Although there 
have been several notable victories for plaintiffs pursuing this strategy,151 ultimately it is the political 
opposition, not the litigation, which is outcome determinative. Moreover, NEPA is ultimately inadequate 
because of the limit that courts place on the consideration of socio-economic factors.152 
 
2.  ILTLA Claims 
 
The ILTLA requires the BIA to ensure that “adequate consideration” has been given to several 
factors before it approves any lease of Native American lands.153 Courts apply the statute in a similar 
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fashion as they do NEPA. If the agency’s ROD inadequately considers the factors in the statute and 
regulations, then a court will require the agency to submit a superiorly reasoned decision. For minority 
tribe members, courts’ current interpretation of the ILTLA as a statute designed to allow tribes 
unfettered discretion is especially burdensome. The District of Utah’s decision to invalidate the BIA’s 
disapproval of the Skull Valley Band’s lease with PFS in Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Davis154 
serves as an example. 
 
In reaching its decision, the court in Skull Valley Band emphasized that the regulations 
implementing the ILTLA made the BIA’s disapproval untenable, but its qualms were primarily related to 
the careless manner in which the agency wrote its ROD, not to the outcome.155 At the time of the 
litigation, 25 C.F.R. § 162.107(a) stated that the BIA will “defer, to the maximum extent possible, to the 
Indian landowners' determination that the lease is in their best interest.”156 The court concluded that the 
BIA did not adequately consider the regulation because it failed to explain why “it was rejecting the 
Band's determination that its lease with PFS was in its best interest.”157 Because the ROD failed to even 
mention the regulation,158 the court declined to enumerate the specific measures that the BIA should 
have taken in order to comply with it.159 Further, the court noted that the BIA failed to even respond to 
the tribe’s offers to address the BIA’s concerns and to provide the BIA with more information.160  
Rather, the BIA concluded that it lacked “sufficient information about the 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) factors” 
needed to decide whether approval was warranted.161 Given the court’s focus on the ROD’s procedural 
inadequacies, it might uphold a new ROD that thoroughly explained its reasoning and carefully 
considered the tribe’s submissions. 
 
Significantly, however, the court’s decision in Skull Valley Band also contains language that 
appears to render BIA disapproval of a lease prohibitively difficult. “[N]ot[ing] that [BIA regulations] 
clearly do[] not mandate that the agency simply acquiesce to the Indian landowner's wishes,”162 the court 
quoted language from Brown v. United States, an opinion of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, in 
emphasizing that the ILTLA was created: 
 
[T]o encourage and enable Indian landowners to handle their own affairs without 
assistance from the federal government.  It is consistent with this basic objective that the 
duties of the government be interpreted minimally, ensuring that Indians receive the full 
responsibility of managing their own affairs.163 
 
The court in Skull Valley Band did not have an opportunity to expand upon the federal government’s 
“minimal[]” duties, but it would be hard to identify a lease that might warrant the BIA’s rejection given 
the court’s tacit approval of a nuclear waste facility. As is explored further in Part V, such a reading of 
the ILTLA would be a mischaracterization of Brown v. United States and would effectively nullify the 
executive’s trust responsibility. 
                                                
154 728 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Utah 2010). 
155 See id. at 1299; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency.”). 
156 The same language is now codified at 25 C.F.R. § 162.441(b) (2014). 
157 728 F. Supp. 2d at 1300 (emphasis in original). 
158 See Skull Valley ROD, supra note 68. 
159 728 F. Supp. 2d at 1301. 
160 Id. at 1300–01. 
161 Id. at 1301. 
162 Id. (emphasis in original). 
163 Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 538, 553 (1998), aff’d, 195 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. (1999)). 




 Even if minority tribe members’ ILTLA and NEPA claims against the BIA’s lease approval were 
to succeed on the merits, however, the BIA would still be able to revisit its decision and issue a new 
approval. Moreover, as the next section discusses, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 may bar most 
minority tribe members from bringing suit under the APA for violation of the ILTLA. 
 
C.  FRCP 19 may bar Most Minority Tribe Members From Asserting ILTLA Claims 
Because the Tribe has Sovereign Immunity and is Likely a Required Party  
 
Rule 19 specifies certain parties that are “required” to be joined in a suit and gives courts 
discretion to determine whether an action may proceed when joinder is not feasible.164 When litigation 
implicates an interest of the tribe, the tribe may be such a required party.165 This poses a problem for 
minority tribe members because of the tribe’s sovereign immunity.166 Minority tribe members may be 
able to overcome this hurdle on an adequate representation theory or by arguing that joinder of the tribe 
would be inequitable, but few courts have been receptive to such arguments.  
 
A party must be joined if he is “subject to service of process,” his joinder “will not deprive the 
court of subject-matter jurisdiction,” he “claims an interest relating to the subject of the action,” and he 
“is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or 
impede the person's ability to protect the interest” or “leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.”167 The 
prejudicial effect is minimized if the “absent party is adequately represented in the suit.”168 Adequate 
representation turns on “whether ‘the interests of a present party to the suit are such that it will 
undoubtedly make all’ of the absent party's arguments; whether the party is ‘capable of and willing to 
make such arguments’; and whether the absent party would ‘offer any necessary element to the 
proceedings’ that the present parties would neglect.”169 
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When a party is required but joinder is “not feasible,” Rule 19(b) outlines four non-exhaustive 
discretionary factors that a court may use to determine whether “in equity and good conscience” the 
action should proceed:170 “the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might 
prejudice that person or the existing parties;” “the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or 
avoided by . . . protective provisions in the judgment . . . shaping the relief[] or . . . other measures;” 
“whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate;” and “whether the plaintiff 
would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.”171 
 
Tewa Tesuque v. Morton presents a paradigmatic case of how minority tribe members might fail 
procedurally under Rule 19.172 In Tewa Tesuque, members of an “unincorporated member association” of 
the Pueblo of Tesuque sued the BIA seeking cancellation of a BIA-approved, ninety-nine year lease 
signed by the tribe and a development company. The development company wanted to construct a 
community of 17,000 non-Indians on the reservation lands.173 The court held that the district court did 
not err in deeming the Pueblo of Tesuque an “indispensable” party,174 which prior to the 2007 
amendment to Rule 19 was the equivalent of “required party” under the current version.175 In rejecting 
reliance on the discretionary factors in 19(b), the court emphasized the tribe’s economic loss from the 
cancellation of the lease, the court’s inability to lessen the burden on the tribe, the likelihood that a 
cancellation of the lease would cause additional lawsuits, and the plaintiffs’ alternate remedy in a tribal 
forum.176 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit because neither the 
tribe, nor Congress on its behalf, had consented to joinder.177 
 
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which minority tribe members could overcome the Rule 19 
hurdle: either by demonstrating that the tribe is not a required party because it is adequately represented 
in the suit or by arguing that despite being a required party, the tribe’s joinder would be inequitable 
under the factors in 19(b). 
 
The Ninth Circuit appears receptive to the argument that the federal government can adequately 
represent the tribe’s interests. In Washington v. Daley, a group of non-Indian fisherman challenged a 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) regulation recognizing certain tribal fishing rights that had 
been established by treaty.178 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s ruling that the tribes were 
required parties under 19(a)(1)(B)179 because of their interest in fishing, but held that the government 
adequately represented the tribes’ interests. There was “no conflict of interest between the federal 
defendants and the Tribes”180 because the NMFS had the same interests as the tribe and had a “trust 
responsibility” to them.181 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the case from a prior 
holding in Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity that dealt with a conflict over ocean harvest quotas assigned to 
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various tribes.182 Since the NMFS regulation’s scope was confined to acknowledging the tribes’ fishing 
rights and did not seek to allocate fish among the tribes, there could be no conflict.183 
 
District courts in the Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, have rejected such adequate 
representation arguments. In Center for Biological Diversity v. Pizarchik, a judge in the District of Colorado 
disagreed with various environmental non-profits that challenged the DOI’s grant of a permit to operate 
a coalmine on a Navajo reservation, holding that the government did not adequately represent the tribe’s 
interests because of the tribe’s “unique role in relation to its members and to the management of its own 
lands.”184 The court emphasized that the DOI would not be economically harmed by the loss of the 
coalmine, as would the tribe.185 
 
Whether minority tribe members will succeed under an adequate representation theory might 
ultimately depend on the circuit in which the litigation occurs. Of the sixteen Phase I applicants under 
the NWN’s program that were tribes, ten were in the Tenth Circuit, four were in the Ninth Circuit, and 
two were in the Eighth Circuit.186 If similar tribes seek to host a nuclear waste facility under the BRC 
proposal, most will be unable to sue on an adequate representation theory.  
 
Success on the theory that the tribe’s joinder would be inequitable, on the other hand, appears 
exceedingly difficult. There do not appear to be any cases where minority tribe members have convinced 
a court not to join the tribe even though the tribe is a required party. For example, in Tewa Tesuque, the 
court held that the tribe would be prejudiced due to its economic interest in the litigation; that lessening 
the prejudice would be impossible; that the tribe’s non-participation in the suit would invite further 
litigation; and that the minority tribe members had an adequate remedy in a tribal forum.187 
 
 Although a court could always accept new arguments about adequate representation or the 
discretionary factors in 19(b), especially if plaintiffs can demonstrate that their case would create an 
unusually inequitable result, minority tribe members will be unlikely to surmount the hurdle posed by 
Rule 19 and tribal sovereign immunity in any court. The Ninth Circuit presents the only glimmer of hope 
for such plaintiffs, but they will still be hard-pressed to succeed on the merits of their ILTLA claim, and 
no action under the APA would permanently defeat the project. Given minority tribe members’ inability 
to prevent construction of the facility, the following section explores the uphill battle they would face if 
they were to sue the BIA for damages. 
 
D.  Minority Tribe Members are Unlikely to Prevail in an Action for Damages Under 
the ILTA Because the ILTLA Probably Fails to Establish an Enforceable 
Fiduciary Duty on the BIA That Runs to Them 
 
The APA may provide an avenue for minority tribe members to temporarily enjoin the BIA’s 
approval of the facility’s lease, but it cannot provide for monetary damages to their reservation.188 The 
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Indian Tucker Act, on the other hand, waives federal sovereign immunity189 and gives the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims “jurisdiction of any claim against the United States . . . in favor of any tribe, band, or 
other identifiable group of American Indians . . . whenever such claim is one arising under the 
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the President . . . .”190  
Nevertheless, the Indian Tucker Act “does not create any substantive right enforceable against the 
United States . . . .”191 Therefore, minority tribe members must identify a source of “substantive law” 
that the U.S. has violated and “demonstrate that . . . [the] law . . . can fairly be interpreted as mandating 
compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.”192 Since the ILTLA provides for 
the federal government’s authority over Native American lands, minority tribes would have to prove that 
they are entitled to damages for the BIA’s breach of the duty imposed by the ILTLA.193 They would only 
succeed in demonstrating their entitlement if the ILTLA established a fiduciary duty on the BIA that ran 
to them. Accordingly, although landowners could successfully recover damages from the BIA for 
property damage caused by the facility, opponents of the project would be unlikely to prevail because the 
“BIA does not manage their interests in a fiduciary capacity.”194 Therefore, minority tribe members are 
unlikely to be directly compensated for damages to their reservation.195 
 
The Supreme Court explored the Indian Tucker Act’s application to the federal government’s 
managerial responsibilities over Native American lands in two opinions arising from the same factual 
circumstances. In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), Native American plaintiffs sought to recover 
damages from the federal government for “mismanagement of timber resources found on the 
Reservation.”196 The Court of Claims had found that the BIA’s statutory mandate to “‘hold the land . . . 
in trust for the sole use and benefit of the’ allottee” created a fiduciary duty on the United States to 
properly manage Native timber resources.197 The plaintiffs could recover “money damages . . . for 
breaches of this trust, apparently because that remedy is available in the ordinary situation in which a 
trustee has violated a fiduciary duty and because without money damages allottees would have no 
effective redress for breaches of trust.”198 Declining to consider whether damages resulting from the 
government’s breach of its trust responsibility were cognizable under the Indian Tucker Act, the 
Supreme Court held that the statute at issue “created only a limited trust relationship between the United 
States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber 
resources.”199 Significantly, however, the Court of Claims had not ruled on the arguments that “other 
statutes . . . render the United States liable in money damages” or that “the alleged mismanagement is 
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cognizable under the Tucker Act because it involves money improperly exacted or retained.” 200  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court declined to consider these claims.201 
 
On remand, the Court of Claims found cognizable claims under “timber management statutes, 
various federal statutes governing road building and rights of way, statutes governing Indian funds and 
government fees, and regulations promulgated under these statutes imposed fiduciary duties” the breach 
of which “implicitly required compensation for damages sustained.”202 The Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that: 
 
[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies 
or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or 
properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said 
expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other fundamental document) 
about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary connection.203 
 
It was sufficient for the Court that “[t]he Department of the Interior . . . exercise[d] literally daily 
supervision over the harvesting and management of tribal timber” and that “[v]irtually every stage of the 
process [was] under federal control.”204 
 
While the Supreme Court has never decided whether the ILTLA and its implementing 
regulations impose an enforceable fiduciary duty on the federal government, the Federal Circuit found 
such a duty in Brown v. United States. 205  In Brown, members of an Indian community, who had 
improvidently leased land to a corporation, claimed that the BIA had breached its fiduciary duty by 
“failing . . . to compel the lessees to fulfill their reporting and payment responsibilities” and “to cancel 
the lease in a timely manner once . . . lease violations were uncovered.”206 Even though the BIA might 
not exercise sufficient “supervision” over Indian leases,207 the court found that the ILTLA “impose[s] an 
enforceable fiduciary duty on the government under the ‘control’ portion of Mitchell II 's [disjunctive] 
‘control or supervision’ test” because Native Americans “do not control the leasing of their lands.”208  
The court emphasized that the BIA must approve a lease for it to be valid, must dictate lease terms, has 
final authority to terminate a lease, and can terminate a lease without the lessor’s consent.209 Moreover, 
Native Americans have no ability to transfer possession or ownership of their lands without engaging in 
the proper procedures with the BIA.210 Finally, the court stressed that several implementing regulations 
give the BIA the responsibility to protect Native Americans’ financial interests in their lands, a common 
characteristic of a private fiduciary relationship.211 
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 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Navajo Nation212 casts doubt on the 
holding in Brown. In Navajo Nation, the Court declined to find a duty imposed by a statute permitting the 
lease of Indian lands for mining purposes “with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior”213 because 
the statute “simply requires Secretarial approval before coal mining leases negotiated between Tribes and 
third parties become effective . . . and authorizes the Secretary generally to promulgate regulations 
governing mining operations.” 214 Importantly, however, the statute at issue in Navajo Nation was 
significantly shorter than the ILTLA, and the Court held inapplicable various additional provisions 
imposing more substantial duties on the Secretary.215 The ILTLA’s additional requirements might 
differentiate it from the statute in Navajo Nation.216 
 
Even if the Supreme Court were to find an enforceable fiduciary duty on the BIA, however, the 
duty probably would not run to non-landowning minority tribe members. Although the court in Brown 
did not focus on this issue, the plaintiffs in that case challenged the BIA’s management of their own 
lands.217 In Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, the First Circuit found this fact decisive in a 
challenge by a group of minority tribe members to their tribe’s approval of a liquified natural gas 
terminal on land with “historical, cultural, religious, and recreational significance.”218 Noting that they 
were “not land owners and the BIA [did] not manage their interests in a fiduciary capacity,”219 the court 
dismissed their claim based on the executive’s trust responsibility. Minority tribe members opposing the 
siting of a nuclear waste facility could argue that they are more like the claimants in Brown, but courts will 
most likely dismiss their claims because they are not beneficiaries of the trust.220 
 
Landowning Native Americans and the tribe itself may succeed in receiving compensation under 
the Indian Tucker Act. However, minority tribe members appear unable to prevent construction of the 
facility under the APA and also appear to lack a remedy for damages. Given minority tribe members’ 
inadequate legal remedies, this Note proposes several recommendations for pending nuclear waste 
legislation in Part V. 
 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NUCLEAR WASTE LEGISLATION  
 
While the BRC’s proposed voluntary siting mechanism alleviates some of the concerns about the 
federal government’s heavy-handedness with regard to the Yucca Mountain site,221 it poses fairness 
concerns of its own. When a nuclear waste facility is located in the center of a small municipality, a local 
government may afford an opportunity for prospective neighbors to be the primary decision-makers in 
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the siting process. A tribe, on the other hand, often has a substantial constituency with equal voting 
rights that lives outside of the reservation. This may lead to non-reservation inhabitants voting to 
approve a facility over the opposition of those who inhabit the area surrounding the proposed site.222  
Additionally, even tribe members who do not reside on the reservation may have a spiritual connection 
to the land that gives them a special interest in preserving it. 
 
Therefore, Congress should use its impending nuclear waste legislation to ensure adequate 
consideration of the interests of minority tribe members and lessen their burden in the event that a 
facility is constructed on their reservation.223 In order to achieve these aims, Congress should clarify the 
necessity of preparing an EIS before finalizing site selection, oppose the co-location of a repository and 
temporary storage facility, require progress toward the development of a repository before searching for 
a temporary facility, and establish a mechanism for tribe members to submit their comments on the 
project. 
 
First, Congress should ensure that the environmental impacts of the site are adequately studied 
through the preparation of an EIS before a tribe accepts the facility. S. 1240, Senator Wyden’s bill, does 
not expressly require an EIS at any point in the process, instead demanding an environmental assessment 
(EA) when determining whether repository sites are suitable for “characterization,” a detailed study of 
the site.224 By failing to specify the timing of an EIS in the statute, Congress would afford too much 
discretion to the Nuclear Waste Administration to decide whether or not to prepare one. Since the 
Supreme Court has been very deferential to agencies in NEPA cases, a challenge to the agency’s NEPA 
regulations would be unlikely to succeed.225 
 
Second, although both the BRC Report and Senator Wyden’s bill in the 113th Congress express 
a preference for the co-location of repositories and storage facilities on the same site,226 Congress should 
refrain from allowing co-location. While it might be both politically astute to have to identify only one 
site and environmentally sound to confine the impacts of nuclear waste to as small a geographic area as 
possible, this provision places a double burden on communities that are willing to host the storage 
facility. Particularly if Congress expresses a preference with regard to co-location, agencies might be 
tempted to pressure tribes into accepting both facilities. The legislative intent behind the Nuclear Waste 
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Policy Act of 1987 was to develop two repositories on either coast in order to equitably balance the 
burden.227 Congress should not depart from that policy.  
 
Third, Congress should require that substantial progress be taken toward the construction of a 
permanent repository before work is commenced on a temporary storage facility in order to prevent 
tribes or other jurisdictions from unwittingly entering a permanent contract with the Nuclear Waste 
Administration. The BIA has expressed concerns that a storage facility could become a de facto 
repository given the current political climate,228 and the existing statute contains provisions to ensure 
some progress on a repository.229 Although Senator Wyden’s bill likewise aims to ensure construction of 
a repository,230 it offers much weaker protections on repository construction than a previous version of 
the bill that was introduced in the 112th Congress.231 Thus, Congress should amend the current bill to 
reflect its 2012 predecessor. 
 
Fourth, Congress should clarify that the ILTLA applies to the lease of the facility and provide 
the BIA with a mechanism for complying with its trust responsibility under the statute. Although the 
BIA acknowledges its trust duties, it appears uncertain how to exercise these duties under the ILTLA. In 
its announcement of the recent revision to the ILTLA regulations governing non-agricultural leases, the 
BIA argued that it does retain some discretion to disapprove leases in certain cases. In response to one 
comment, the BIA asserted that it could not “provide that leases are always in the best interest of the 
Indian landowners because BIA is required to determine whether this is true.”232 On the other hand, the 
BIA failed to identify any constraints on its exercise of discretion. Another commenter asked the BIA to 
“[a]dd examples of what a ‘compelling reason’ to disapprove may be.”233 The BIA responded that it 
“could not identify an example,” but that the standard was necessary in case a “unique situation” arose 
that “would clearly warrant disapproval.”234 At another point in the notice, the BIA suggested that “the 
best interest determination includes factors beyond monetary compensation and that it will vary 
according to circumstances,”235 but could not reach a greater level of specificity. As the BIA’s Skull 
Valley ROD demonstrates,236 the lease for a nuclear waste facility could be a “unique situation” that 
“would clearly warrant disapproval.” 
 
In order to ensure that the BIA correctly identifies such a unique situation warranting 
disapproval, Congress should instruct the BIA to incorporate minority tribe members into the decision-
making process by providing a mechanism through which they can submit written comments for the 
BIA’s consideration.237 These comments might cause the BIA to more deeply contemplate various 
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issues, such as the facility’s impact on the “long-term viability of the . . . reservation as a homeland for 
the [tribe].”238 Margene Bullcreek was particularly worried about the consequences of damage to hard-
fought reservation land, which provided a link to previous generations;239 and scholars have noted that 
the reservation is the only tool that allows tribes to maintain their independence from the rest of 
American society.240 Moreover, the addition of minority tribe members’ concerns about their reservation 
may increase the likelihood of the BIA’s lease denial being upheld on review.241 The BIA would benefit 
from an organized process for receiving and responding to such input. 
 
Although the siting process will inevitably leave some community members displeased with the 
results, Congress’s adequate consideration of minority interests will help ensure that many of the 
minority’s concerns are addressed. Further, Congress’s modifications to the procedures for siting storage 
facilities and repositories will minimize the burden on members of the minority once the facility is built. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In many of the countries that have chosen to pursue nuclear power, the issue of where to 
dispose of spent fuel waste has generated an enormous amount of controversy.242 Particularly spirited 
opposition has come from individuals who would have to live near the waste.243 In the 1980s, the United 
States sought to confront such resistance by mandating the construction of a repository at Yucca 
Mountain without allowing local communities to have a voice in the siting decision.244 The recent BRC 
Report proposes a voluntary siting method whereby communities would be able to vote and decide 
whether to host a facility.245 
 
Native Americans are likely to be the primary participants in a voluntary siting process because 
of the apparent willingness of many to accept nuclear waste facilities on their reservations and the 
political difficulties that many municipalities would face if they pursued such facilities.246 Minority tribe 
members are especially affected by nuclear waste facilities because they may live closer to the facilities 
than the majority or have a unique spiritual connection to the land, 247  have traditionally been 
underrepresented in siting discussions after losing intra-tribal votes,248 and possess inadequate legal 
remedies.249 Since the decision process for any nuclear waste facility is likely to last several years, these 
minority tribe members deserve to play a greater role in site analysis; and no site should be pursued 
without their substantial input. 
 
Therefore, Congress should address some of these impacts in its impending nuclear waste 
legislation by clarifying the necessity to prepare an EIS before finalizing site selection, opposing the co-
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location of a repository and temporary storage facility, requiring progress toward the development of a 
repository before triggering the search for a temporary facility, and establishing a mechanism for tribe 
members to submit their comments on the project. Although Congress walks a thin line between 
ensuring fairness and unjustly infringing on local control and tribal sovereignty, it must take certain 
measures so that tribal minorities are not marginalized in the siting process. By minimizing adverse 
impacts and incorporating diverse views, Congress may even succeed in easing the prolonged 
controversy surrounding nuclear waste facilities. 
